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The Limits of Prodemocratic International Law in
Europe
Aslı Ü. Bâli*

Abstract
Tom Ginsburg’s Democracies and International Law explores the ways in which regional
human rights regimes have been designed to promote and protect democracy and the degree of their
success in an age of democratic backsliding. In this symposium contribution, I examine the impact
of the relationship between the European Union (E.U.) and Turkey on that country’s record of
democratic backsliding. I argue that European countries’ difficulties in managing multi-racial
democracy have limited the depth and effectiveness of the E.U.’s pro-democratic commitments in
its dealings with Turkey.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tom Ginsburg’s Democracies and International Law offers a careful and
wonderfully well-documented account of how international law can reinforce or
undermine democratic governance within states. At a time when worries about
democratic backsliding dominate the growing comparative law literature,
Ginsburg—who has been an important contributor to those debates—sets his
sights here on the international law dimension of these questions. The book
provides an excellent starting point for considering what role international
institutions might play in combating legal strategies deployed by authoritarians to
subvert democracy. In this short Essay, I take up one strand of Ginsburg’s
argument concerning the specific role played by the European Union (E.U.),
which has long understood itself as producing a form of democracy-enhancing
international law in its own region. Based on a close examination of the
developments in Hungary and Poland, Ginsburg takes the view that the E.U. has
been better at laying out norms than enforcing them, proving especially ineffective
at confronting democratic backsliding among its member states.1 I agree with this
analysis and explore its implications by examining the course of accession
negotiations with Turkey.
Though Ginsburg does not directly address the Turkish case, his book
provides a useful complement to his consideration of countries engaging with
European institutions while experiencing democratic decay.2 This is because E.U.
institutions once incentivized significant democratic consolidation in Turkey, but
later proved unexpectedly weak when confronted with backsliding. The case
mirrors to some extent the E.U.’s limited traction in constraining the autocratic
turn in Hungary and Poland.3 Yet, the weakness of E.U. constraints is more
surprising in the Turkish case, given that the E.U. should theoretically have more
effective carrots and sticks while a country is still pursuing accession. Indeed,
Ginsburg observes that the extensive monitoring of candidate countries at the
“front end of EU accession” represents the high point of the prodemocratic
pressure that Europe can exert.4 In the following pages, I argue that Europe’s
prodemocratic commitments themselves have proven to be self-limiting.
1
2

3

4

See TOM GINSBURG, DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (2022).
The phrase “democratic decay” is borrowed from Ginsburg’s earlier work with Aziz Huq. See Aziz
Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 80 (2018).
In his Essay for this Symposium, Ginsburg argues that the Hungarian election of 2022 will be an
important test of whether the E.U. has been able to constrain democratic backsliding in that
country. Tom Ginsburg, Democracies and International Law: An Update, 23 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 1, 18–21
(2022). Regrettably, the results confirm the ineffectiveness of European institutions in this regard.
See Justyna Pawlak & Krisztina Than, Orbán Scores Crushing Victory as Ukraine War Solidifies Support,
REUTERS (April 3, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungarians-vote-orbans-12year-rule-tight-ballot-overshadowed-by-ukraine-war-2022-04-03/ (last visited May 6, 2022).
GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 160.
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Ultimately, when confronted with managing pluralism and the demands of
multi-racial democracy, the E.U.’s commitments have faltered.

II. GINSBURG’S DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In Democracies and International Law, Ginsburg makes several important
arguments. First, he contends that international law is largely produced and
utilized by democratic states, both for their relations with one another and to
structure interactions with nondemocracies.5 He also finds that the resulting
international legal order is prodemocratic in the sense that legal tools are available
to shore up new democracies and impose costs on states that violate human rights.
Ginsburg categorizes international legal resources to support democratic
maintenance as carrots and sticks:6 carrots provide public goods that help sustain
democratic commitments, while sticks include the imposition of damages against
states for misbehavior.7 As examples, he notes the incentives provided by the
E.U.’s accession protocols for Eastern European countries and, conversely, the
ability of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to issue damage awards
where states in the Council of Europe are found to have violated human rights
obligations.8
Ginsburg then examines the degree to which the E.U. has succeeded in
supporting democratic maintenance in its region. He notes that the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was designed to defend democracy on the
continent after the Second World War, by tying the hands of member states to
prevent the kind of democratic erosion that attended the rise of fascism in the
first half of the twentieth century.9 He rightly observes, however, that the ECHR
and the ECtHR have proven unable to staunch democratic backsliding today, with
a massive backlog of cases and difficulty addressing rights abuses in countries like
Russia and Turkey.10 Although these countries are in the Council of Europe, they
are at best partially consolidated democracies. In the case of Turkey, Ginsburg
notes that the ECtHR has systematically failed to protect the rights of minorities
in the country.11 One might add that it has scarcely done better in the last five
years at protecting the civil and political rights of any Turkish citizens.12 Ginsburg
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 7.
See id. at 114.
See id. at 115–18.
See id. at 115.
See id. at 144–45.
See id. at 151.
See id.
See, e.g., Ali Yildiz, The ECHR’s Priority Policy Is Failing Turkey’s Human Rights Victims, AHVAL NEWS
(Nov. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/S9MT-WD22 (noting that “Turkey’s political prisoners are
being failed not just by the Turkish judicial system, but also by the [ECtHR]”).
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concludes that the E.U. has “not been particularly effective at confronting
backsliding in its region, being much better at laying out norms than enforcing
them.”13 Yet, he argues that where the E.U. has been slow to respond to
democratic erosion among its members, it has been better able to impose
conditions on countries while they are pursuing accession.14
The Turkish case is precisely one of a country still at the front end of E.U.
accession.15 Turkey thus faces a more effective range of carrots and sticks than
what the Union and its human rights machinery have been able to impose on
those countries that have already been admitted as members, like Hungary and
Poland.16 In the remainder of this Essay, I will explore why it is that even for a
country like Turkey, the E.U.’s legal resources to support democratic maintenance
have proven ineffective. To answer this question, I focus on two pivotal moments
since negotiations on Turkey’s accession began: first, the 2005 debate about a
European Constitution in which Turkish accession became the foil for racialized
anxieties about European identity. And second, a decade later, the willingness to
strike a bargain with Turkey to stave off a perceived migration crisis. There is no
doubt that Turkey has experienced serious internal democratic regression, if not
reversal, during this period, but I will argue that challenges internal to the E.U.’s
own democratic commitments are also reflected in these two moments. These
challenges have played a (perhaps decisive) role in constraining Europe’s ability to
challenge Turkey’s authoritarian turn.

III. FROM DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION TO DEMOCRATIC EROSION:
TWO PIVOTAL MOMENTS
Turkey first signed a Customs Union agreement with the E.U. in 1995 and
was officially recognized as a candidate for full membership in 1999.17 In the latter
half of the 1990s, the prospect of E.U. candidacy led the country to take significant
steps towards democratic consolidation. Once it became a candidate country,
from 2000 to 2005, Turkey passed a sweeping set of constitutional and legislative

13

GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 153.

14

See id. at 159–60.

15

On Turkey’s ongoing—but stalled—accession negotiations with the E.U., see, for example, Ilke
Toygür, A New Way Forward for EU-Turkey Relations, CARNEGIE EUROPE (Jan. 26, 2022),
https://perma.cc/2WXF-KPML.
On the challenge posed by Poland and Hungary to E.U. norms on democracy and the rule of law,
see, for example, Wojciech Moskwa, Zoltan Simon and Rodney Jefferson, The EU Bankrolled a
Rebellion that Threatens to Tear It Apart, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/6FEKESX7 (arguing that “Poland and Hungary have used the largesse of the European Union to
undermine democracy and the rule of law”).

16

17

See, e.g., Birol A. Yesilada, Turkey’s Candidacy for EU Membership, 56 MIDDLE E.J. 94, 95 (2002).
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reforms designed to fulfill the E.U.’s accession criteria.18 The governing Justice
and Development Party (known by its Turkish language acronym, AKP) oversaw
many of these reforms and ran repeatedly in national elections by campaigning in
favor of greater political liberalization and E.U. accession.19 Yet after 2005, the
reform momentum slowed significantly.20 Later packages of constitutional
amendments had an instrumental character, combining liberalizing features with
changes to political institutions that inured largely to the benefit of the AKP.21
Why was there an inflection point in Turkey’s democratic progress after
2005? After all, 2005 was the very year that accession talks began, and the country
should have been presented with an even more attractive set of carrots for
democratic consolidation. The E.U. served as a powerful engine for much-needed
democratizing reforms until 2005, and E.U. accession was popular across most
constituencies in Turkey at that point.22 This enabled the AKP to benefit from a
broad coalition of support, including among Turkish liberals who might otherwise
have been loath to make common cause with an Islamist political party.23 I have
previously argued that the AKP leadership might best be understood as accidental
democrats pursuing reforms out of tactical interest convergence, rather than
principled commitment,24 but there is an alternative explanation for the slowing
reform momentum, which lies with the E.U. rather than the AKP.

A. 2005: The Limits of European Prodemocratic Carrots
Accession talks for Turkey to join the E.U. began in earnest in 2005, after
the country made substantial progress towards meeting the criteria that the
18

19

20

21

22

23

24

See, e.g., Meltem Müftüler Bac, Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union, 10 J. SO.
EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 16, 21–27 (2005).
Kemal Kirişci & Amanda Sloat, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Democracy in Turkey: Implications for the West,
BROOKINGS (Feb. 2019), https://perma.cc/N8QA-HGUN (noting that “the democratic and
economic achievements of the AKP’s early years helped launch membership negotiations with the
European Union”).
See, e.g., EU Parliament Slams Turkey’s Slow Reform, EURACTIV NEWS (Nov. 28, 2008),
https://perma.cc/BAT7-WYX8.
See, e.g., Gunes Murat Tezcur, Turkey’s Referendum: A Democratic Dynamic, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Sept.
15, 2010), https://perma.cc/28AH-VGXB (noting the mix of liberalizing and controversial
amendments in the 2010 constitutional referendum in Turkey).
For a discussion of polling data on Turkish support for E.U. accession, see Nesibe Hicret Soy,
Survey: Turkish Support for EU Membership on Decline, Opinion Divided on NATO, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
(Sept. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/D77K-7T99 (noting that 63 percent of Turks supported E.U.
membership in 2005, with support declining in subsequent years).
See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Turkey’s Liberals Speaking Out as Reform Stalls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24,
2008), https://perma.cc/MK68-CU99 (noting that Turkey’s liberals supported Erdogan’s reform
agenda and bid for E.U. accession in his first term).
Aslı Ü. Bâli, The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and the Turkish Example, 52 VA.
J. INT’L L. 235, 316 (2011) (noting that the AKP may be “accidental democrats”).
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European Council adopted in 1993 for any new members.25 Those criteria—
including stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights, and protection of minorities within candidate countries26—exerted
palpable prodemocratic influence on Turkish political actors over the prior
decade.27 On December 17, 2004, the E.U. decided that Turkey had made
sufficient progress to be admitted to consideration for membership,28 but that
determination coincided with a number of adverse developments on the
European side related to what would soon become a failed effort to adopt an E.U.
Constitutional Treaty.29
Turkish accession raised a prospect absent from earlier E.U. enlargement
discussions concerning new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The
fact of possible E.U. membership for a Muslim-majority country triggered
anxieties amongst the domestic publics of major European states including
France, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. Public statements by leading
political figures in Europe, including current and former presidents, 30 prime
ministers,31 and chancellors,32 indicated that they shared these concerns. A once
tacit recognition became increasingly explicit: the E.U. is a Christian club,33 and
allowing Turkish accession might amount, in the words of the former president
of France, Valerie Giscard d’Estaing, to the “end of Europe.”34
25

26

27

28

29

See Kivanc Ulusoy, Turkey’s Reform Effort Reconsidered, 1987-2004, 14 DEMOCRATIZATION 472, 473
(2007) (detailing Turkish reforms leading to its consideration for E.U. membership).
See Copenhagen Criteria, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION DEV. (June 11, 2013),
https://perma.cc/4MMX-G54B.
See, e.g., MICHAEL EMERSON, CTR. EUR. POL’Y STUD., HAS TURKEY FULFILLED THE COPENHAGEN
POLITICAL CRITERIA? CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 48, 2–3 (2004), https://perma.cc/EM9Q-NXQX.
See Kemal Kirişci, The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an Historic Turning Point?,
6(4) INSIGHT TURKEY 101, 101 (2004).
On the crisis over the Constitutional Treaty, see MAI’A K. DAVIS CROSS, THE POLITICS OF CRISIS
IN EUROPE 108–59 (2017).

30

See Elaine Sciolino, Ex-French President Snubs Turks on Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2002),
https://perma.cc/M42M-8D89; Honor Mahony, Chirac Says Turkey Needs ‘Major Cultural
Revolution’ to Join EU, EU OBSERVER (Oct. 5, 2005), https://perma.cc/G8RL-VUN5 (noting that
then-president of France, Jacques Chirac, expressed doubt “about whether the huge, mainly
Muslim country would ever become a member of the bloc” in public comments).

31

For instance, then French Prime Minister Jean Marie Raffarin asked publicly in discussing Turkish
accession: “Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?” See Raffarin Demurs
on Turkey’s EU Bid, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2005), at A13.
The Austrian Chancellor at the time, Wolfgang Schüssel, opposed Turkish accession citing public
skepticism. See Graham Bowley, Turkey: Austrians Just Say No, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2005),
https://perma.cc/BN9H-9EBW.
See Joseph Liu, Does ‘Muslim’ Turkey Belong in ‘Christian’ Europe?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2005),
https://perma.cc/3XGC-3RZB.

32

33

34

Valerie Giscard d’Estaing stated publicly that Turkey is not a European country but from “another
culture, another way of life” and that its integration in the E.U. would constitute “the end of
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The first occasion to test whether accession was a serious political possibility
came indirectly, with referenda across Europe on a draft E.U. constitution that
served as an unexpected proxy for public views about Turkish membership.
Opponents of the constitution campaigned against the treaty, which would have
streamlined decision-making in the bloc, by mobilizing around the alleged risks of
Turkish accession.35 When referenda on the constitutional project failed in France
and the Netherlands in early summer 2005, analysts noted that a major factor
motivating voters had been cultural fears about Turkish membership. 36 The
character of the racially charged campaigns against the E.U. constitution hardly
escaped notice in Turkey, eroding support for E.U. membership.37 In addition,
key analysts drew the conclusion that the prospect of “Turkey becoming a full
member of the E.U. is virtually dead” after the failed referenda.38
Contemporaneous analyses of European anxieties about Turkish accession
included a host of issues, with cultural identity being perhaps most salient. In the
words of one scholar writing in 2005:
. . . the very prospect of Turkish membership . . . is a heated topic of
discussion in Europe, with many politicians and national publics skeptical
about the wisdom of offering membership to Turkey. Many of Turkey’s
supposed shortcomings are well-known: it is too big, too poor, too
agricultural, too authoritarian and, perhaps above all, too Muslim.39

Turkish citizens, in turn, became frustrated and pessimistic about prospects
for full membership when they perceived European publics as rejecting the

35

36

37

38
39

Europe.” Senem Aydin Düzgit, Constructing Europe through Turkey: French Perceptions of Turkey’s
Accession to the European Union, 3 POLITIQUE EUROPÉENE 47, 49 (2009).
The question of Turkish accession was not a part of the constitutional referendum in any of these
countries. But because the E.U. constitution was designed to improve decision-making in an
enlarged bloc following accession by Central and Eastern European countries, it was seen as related
to enlargement by many constituencies. See Nicolas de Boisgrollier, Will the EU Constitution Survive a
Referendum in France?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2005), https://perma.cc/6EVM-5WGH (noting that
“Turkey’s possible future entry in the European Union has largely overshadowed—if not
hijacked—the constitutional debate”).
See, e.g., Dutch Say ‘Devastating No’ to EU Constitution, GUARDIAN (June 2, 2005),
https://perma.cc/3PFA-Z6LE (noting that “Anti-Muslim sentiment, opposition to EU
membership for Turkey and fears over losing control over immigration policy all contributed to the
French and Dutch votes”); see also Sara Binzer Hobolt & Sylvain Brouard, Contesting the European
Union? Why the Dutch and the French Rejected the European Constitution, 64 POL. RSCH. Q. 309, 315 (2011)
(including Turkish accession as one of the dimensions motivating French and Dutch “no” voters).
See Many in Turkey Fear Defeat Could Hurt Application for EU Membership, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2005),
https://perma.cc/9KJW-RKQD (noting that Turks “were dismayed by some of the anti-Turkey
rhetoric used in the campaign”).
Id.
Paul Kubicek, Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities, 168 WORLD AFFS.
67, 67 (2005).
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prospect of admitting a Muslim-majority country.40 As additional reform criteria
were applied to Turkey beyond those required for accession of Eastern European
states, even liberal Turks who once served as the core constituency supporting
E.U. membership raised questions about double standards.41 From the beginning
of accession talks, European leaders in France and Germany openly discussed
alternatives to full membership for Turkey,42 and within two years talks had
stalled.43 Turks viewed these proposals as a form of “second-class” membership
reserved for their country.44
While there are many explanations for the course of negotiations between
the E.U. and Turkey, these prominent political campaigns against Turkish
membership just as talks were beginning significantly depreciated the value of the
prodemocratic “carrot” of accession. Growing skepticism among the Turkish
public over prospects for accession reduced the momentum behind reform
initiatives that had been presented as part of a broader strategy of integration with
Europe. Beyond reducing incentives for reform, the anti-Turkish animus
expressed in those political campaigns points to a deeper problem with the
character of the E.U.’s prodemocratic commitments.45 At bottom, the referendum
campaigns expressed public anxiety over preserving European culture and
civilization from the pressures of greater diversity. The admission of a
Muslim-majority country to full membership in Europe would have offered
freedom of movement to Turkish citizens to settle and work in E.U. countries.
But the reality in 2005—and nearly two decades later—is that European countries
have struggled to maintain their democratic commitments in governing multiracial, multi-religious societies.46 The depreciation in the value of the “carrot” of
40

41

42

43

44

45

46

See, e.g., Fuat Canan, Main Costs and Benefits of Turkish Access to the European Union, 9 INSIGHT TURKEY
7, 17–18 (2007) (noting that the “lack of clear and consistent EU strategy and commitment towards
Turkey . . . has made Turkish public opinion suspicious and anxious in their journey and in turn has
given teeth to opponents to EU accession”).
Id. at 18 (describing the additional criteria and criticism from Turkey’s leading liberal think tank that
these amounted to “double standards” in the E.U.’s treatment of the country).
See Luke Harding & Nicholas Watt, Turkey’s EU Dream Dealt Double Blow as Chirac and Merkel Raise
Doubts, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2005), https://perma.cc/PX8A-3YMP.
Dan Bilefsky, As EU Talks Stall, Turks Question pro-West Policy - Europe – International Herald Tribune
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2006), https://perma.cc/2T69-MTDC (quoting a Turkish interviewee
reporting that “many Turks feel like we are just wasting our time with the EU that will never accept
a Muslim country”).
See, e.g., Serkan Demirtaş, Turkey Says ‘No’ to Second Class EU Membership, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS
(Nov. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/GAJ2-A5F5.
For a contemporaneous account of “mounting anti-Turkish sentiment” across Europe in 2005, see
Ian Black, The Tip of the Anti-Turkish Iceberg, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2005), https://perma.cc/H2YXDVQJ.
See, e.g., Leila Hadj-Abdou, Racism in Europe: A Challenge for Democracy?, in CHALLENGES OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS NEIGHBORS 25–42 (Aylin Ünver Noi & Sasha
Toperich eds., 2016).
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accession is not just a story about weak international institutions, then. Rather, it
is a problem related to internal tensions within the European democratic project
that offer an important complement to Ginsburg’s account of the prodemocratic
regional capacities of E.U. institutions.

B. 2015: Assessing European Sticks to Prevent Democratic
Erosion
Between 2005 and 2015, Turkey underwent a period of marked democratic
backsliding. While several additional constitutional and political reforms were
passed in this period, their democratizing and liberalizing credentials were more
ambiguous than those of earlier reforms.47 In the meantime, E.U. accession talks
remained largely stalled.48 The erstwhile prime minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip
Erdoǧan, became the first directly elected president in August 2014, and his
government presided over an alarming deterioration in the country’s human rights
record and democratic pedigree.49 While he was prime minister, Erdoǧan’s
government violently quashed nationwide protests in 2013 against the
government’s increasing authoritarianism.50 A corruption probe against Erdoǧan’s
regime resulted in purges of judges and prosecutors in a full-scale assault on the
rule of law beginning the following year.51 As Ginsburg notes, European
institutions have fashioned not only prodemocratic carrots, but also “sticks”
designed to punish rights abuses, abrogation of the rule of law, and democratic
erosion.52 If European carrots were depreciated by anti-Turkish political
campaigns in 2005, have any of the “sticks” fared better in constraining
misbehavior by the Turkish government?

47

48

49

50

51

52

Reforms in this period included a 2007 constitutional amendment that allowed for direct elections
for president and a package of constitutional amendments in 2010 that combined liberalizing
provisions on individual rights with a restructuring of the judiciary that led some analysts to worry
about separation of powers. See, e.g., Haldun Gülalp, The Battle for Turkey’s Constitution, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 4, 2010), https://perma.cc/KH7L-SL2H. In the end, those worries were later realized by
separate moves by the government to purge the judiciary beginning in 2014. See Oya Yegen, Turkey
Rolling Back the 2010 Reforms?, INT’L. J. CONST. L. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2014), https://perma.cc/R565PGAS.
See William Chislett, Turkey’s 10 Years of EU Accession Negotiations: No End in Sight, ELCANO ROYAL
INST. (Oct. 5. 2015), https://perma.cc/KV8C-KC5N.
See, e.g., WORLD REPORT 2015: TURKEY, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2015), https://perma.cc/2J69-GL9W
(finding that Erdoǧan’s government was “undermining the gains of the past decade with steps that
erode human rights and the rule of law in Turkey”).
See AMNESTY INT’L, GEZI PROTESTS: BRUTAL DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY IN
TURKEY 5–6 (2013), https://perma.cc/58F4-YKCM.
See Daren Butler & Nick Tattersall, Turkish Judicial Purge Brings Corruption Investigation to a Halt,
REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/PMY6-LKQ9.
See Section II.
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In assessing the capacity of E.U. institutions to disincentivize rights
violations and democratic erosion in Turkey, it is first worth noting that the
ECtHR has had a positive influence on the country’s human rights record during
some periods, and the court’s decisions have shaped aspects of domestic
jurisprudence on rights questions.53 At a time when E.U. accession was being
pursued in earnest, domestic institutions ranging from the parliament, to the
courts, to Turkish human rights organizations took note of adverse decisions by
the Strasbourg court, and the requirements of the ECHR influenced constitutional
reforms.54 However, as the E.U. faced a new crisis in grappling with pluralism,
bilateral priorities in the relationship with Turkey shifted away from human rights
in ways that eroded the capacity of regional institutions to constrain rights abuses.
In 2015, the then-four-year-old war in Syria, which had produced millions of
refugees absorbed by neighboring countries including Turkey, suddenly topped
the European agenda.55 After years of failed commitments to fund United Nations
relief efforts to assist Syrian civilians,56 the arrival of hundreds of thousands of
refugees crossing land borders in the Balkans and arriving on Europe’s shores in
Greece was deemed a “migration crisis.”57
The reception of refugees varied dramatically across the E.U., with the
region’s shared asylum policy unraveling as a consequence of political backlash
and nativist policies in several countries.58 By the end of 2015, Germany had
absorbed the largest proportion of arriving refugees—almost one million—but
the government’s decision to receive this population was engendering
opposition.59 Even Germany’s reception of refugees paled in comparison to the
53

54

55

56

57

58

59

See, e.g., Başak Çalı, Turkey’s Relationship with the European Court of Human Rights Shows that Human
Rights Courts Play a Vital Role, but One that Can Often Be Vastly Improved, LSE BLOG (Mar. 14, 2012),
https://perma.cc/RHC4-2P8R.
Ergun Özbudun & Füsun Türkmen, Impact of the ECtHR Rulings on Turkey’s Democratization: An
Evaluation, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 985 (2013). See also Individual Application Has Led to a Revolutionary Change
in the Turkish Legal Order, CONST. CT. REP. TURKEY (Sept. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/R95DQRDY (noting that the “ECtHR’s case-law has had a determining impact on the progress of the
constitutional and legal system of Turkey”).
See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Refugee Crisis in Europe Prompts Western Engagement in Syria, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/MD7J-N7J6.
See HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON HUMANITARIAN FINANCING REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY GENERAL, TOO IMPORTANT TO FAIL—ADDRESSING THE HUMANITARIAN FUNDING
GAP 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/Z3RD-KTE2 (noting that in 2015 “1.6 million Syrian refugees
had their food rations cut and 750,000 Syrian children could not attend school” due to failure to
secure relief funds).
Jeanne Park, Europe’s Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://perma.cc/H9AV-HQM9.
See Lillian M. Langford, Note, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations under the Common European
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efforts that had already been made at that point by Turkey and other neighboring
countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, with far smaller economies than those of
their European counterparts.60 The size of the E.U.’s territory, population, and
economy should have enabled the region to easily manage refugee flows on the
scale reaching the bloc in 2015,61 but the ethnic and religious identity of the new
arrivals triggered similar anxieties to those that had been voiced over Turkish
accession a decade earlier.62
The European experience of migration as a crisis produced a new political
imperative in the region: striking deals with neighbors outside E.U. borders to
prevent migrants and refugees from crossing into Europe. At a time when
Turkey’s human rights record had been raising serious alarms in Europe—from
the authoritarian turn of Erdoǧan’s government to renewed violence against the
country’s Kurdish minority—the imperatives of migration control rehabilitated
the E.U.’s willingness to enter into a tactical partnership with Turkey.63 German
Chancellor Angela Merkel was widely seen as the driving force behind a new E.U.Turkey “refugee deal” in 2016.64 Turkey agreed that Greece could “return”
migrants deemed ineligible for asylum in the E.U. in exchange for funding to help
support the nearly four million Syrian refugees in Turkey and promises of visa-free
travel to Europe for Turkish citizens.65 The agreement was widely denounced by
human rights advocates as a betrayal of the E.U.’s humanitarian values and an
outsourcing of its migration policies to Turkey.66 The Turkish public viewed the
60
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Million for First Time, U.N. HIGH COMM’R REFUGEES (July 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/J3P4-79B8.
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deal as evidence of the shallow commitment to human rights and humanitarianism
in Europe.67 Moreover, a critical aspect of the deal—the promise of visa-free travel
for Turkish citizens to Europe—never materialized, leading to further
resentment.68 But for the Turkish government, the deal marked the end of credible
European pressure on the country over its human rights record.69
The aftermath of an attempted coup in Turkey accelerated the Erdoǧan
government’s slide into authoritarianism,70 but the European Union was widely
perceived as muting its criticism in service of striking and maintaining a deal to
stem the flow of migrants.71 This combination of events left the Turkish
government almost entirely impervious to European “sticks.”72 The ECtHR also
proved incapable of addressing its substantial docket of Turkish applicants seeking
redress from widespread human rights violations in the aftermath of the 2016
coup attempt.73 The following year, a constitutional amendment package passed
under the cover of a state of emergency introduced an overtly anti-democratic set
of reforms that reversed whatever progress had been achieved in pursuit of
accession. Yet, despite repeated high-level European engagement with Turkey on
a range of issues, democracy and human rights rarely topped the agenda.74 Annual
calls from European parliamentarians to suspend Turkish accession talks over the
country’s ever-deteriorating human rights record have fallen on deaf ears in
Brussels and Ankara alike since the 2016 migration deal.75
2016), https://perma.cc/Y8RZ-M34H (denunciation of the human rights implications of the deal
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The E.U. may have been even more adept at disabling the “sticks” to
penalize democratic backsliding than it had been in depreciating the
prodemocratic “carrot” of accession. Once again, the underlying reason was tied
to a crisis in Europe’s own democratic commitments when faced with the
challenge of honoring the human rights of refugees and grappling with the
prospect of governing a multiracial society.76

IV. EUROPE’S AUTHORITARIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The question of how Western democracies cope with the challenge of
diversity has gained increasing urgency in the last five years, particularly following
the election of Donald Trump in the U.S. and the rise of populist leaders in
Europe. In his widely read foreword in the Harvard Law Review, Michael Klarman
examined “the role of demographic change, immigration, and increasing racial
resentment in seeding disaffection with democracy.”77 Klarman observed that the
world “has almost no experience with true multiracial democracy” and that
democracy only succeeded in Europe after “ethnic heterogeneity had been
eliminated by two world wars.”78 One of the enduring challenges in post-war
Europe has been managing the integration of racial minorities from former
colonies and immigrants originally invited as temporary guest workers into their
polities.79 The result has been mixed at best, with profound issues of racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and even paroxysms of ultra-nationalist violence in
countries like France and Germany.80 Problems of racism and discrimination in
Europe are especially acute in the context of migration,81 which offers an
important lens on the self-limiting quality of prodemocratic European
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international institutions. When democratic commitments have clashed with
concerns over migration and anxieties about European cultural identity,
prodemocratic legal tools have largely been sidelined in favor of expedient
compromises.
The failure to grapple with the demands of multiracial democracy has been
more damaging than just disabling Europe’s pro-democratic carrots and sticks for
potential candidates for accession. As Ginsburg ably chronicles in his book—and
the update he provides in this Symposium—democratic backsliding has taken root
among E.U. member states themselves.82 Hungary is perhaps the premier example
of a country in which a political entrepreneur has weaponized populist,
anti-immigrant politics and established an electoral autocracy internal to the E.U.83
The E.U.’s relationship to Turkey suggests a troubling complement to this story.
To manage the perceived threat that migration poses to the European project,
some of the most purportedly liberal countries in the E.U. led the charge to enter
a partnership with a Turkish government that they viewed as anti-democratic and
rights-abusive. Moreover, the migration deal with Turkey was just one of several
similar partnerships with abusive authoritarian regimes and even armed militias in
the Middle East.84 Far from serving prodemocratic ends, Europe’s foreign policies
with respect to its southern neighbors, driven by migration and security concerns,
have often provided implicit and even explicit support for authoritarianism. 85 In
other words, Europe has participated in generating new forms of authoritarian
international law, using treaties to subcontract migrant interdiction and rights
abuses to autocratic partners at its borders.
The use of international law by the E.U. in ways that lend support to
authoritarians and pursue ends that violate human and refugee rights deserves
examination in its own right as a threat to the idea of prodemocratic international
law. The current war in Ukraine risks further dampening the E.U.’s appetite for
penalizing democratic backsliding. With Poland emerging as an important
frontline state in the conflict with Russia, earlier criticisms of the Warsaw
government’s erosion of judicial independence are unlikely to remain salient. New
82
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concerns about European security may well displace the region’s prioritization of
democracy in much the same way that anxieties about migration muted concerns
about Turkey’s rights record. While Turkey may pursue some of the authoritarian
international law strategies identified by Ginsburg—reducing dependence on
Western partners and joining alternative authoritarian international arrangements
like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization86—it may no longer need such a
hedge, with the E.U. willing to enter long-term partnerships on authoritarian
terms. Ginsburg observes that “prodemocratic law may exist at the same time as
authoritarian international law.”87 In the case of Europe, increasingly, the two
strategies may coexist within the same regional arrangements.

V. CONCLUSION
An examination of the record of Turkey’s E.U. accession bid reveals more
than a story about how international pressure may fail to prevent democratic
regression. Beyond the well-known trajectory of Turkey’s authoritarian turn lies a
more nuanced account of the compliance pull once exerted by Europe’s accession
criteria and the E.U.’s diminishing capacity to leverage reforms in light of anxieties
about diversity. Political entrepreneurs in Europe have ably deployed fears of
Turkish migrants and refugee arrivals to pursue reactionary ends, from the
constitutional referenda of 2005 to Brexit in 2016. The Turkish public, in turn,
readily appreciated the implications for prospects of E.U. membership. While this
represents only one element of the vexed E.U.-Turkey relationship, it is both
important and underappreciated.
In the end, when confronted with the challenge of pluralism, the fragility of
commitments to core democratic and liberal tenets at the heart of the Western
international legal order may be as worrying as the rise of authoritarian
international law. This suggests that preventing democratic backsliding will require
more than international legal institutions that offer technical cooperation or best
practices to combat corruption, and even more than the fairly significant carrots
and sticks that E.U. accession once provided. What is needed is renewed effort to
grapple with the challenges of democratic governance in multiracial societies. The
consolidated democracies of Europe and North America have long depended for
their stability on a tacit demographic majority, whether in terms of ethnic,
religious, or racial identity. Weaning themselves from a democratic politics of
privileged insiders and permanent outsiders is an immense challenge.
Unfortunately, the failure to do so provides an invitation to a politics of
resentment—one that has become the calling card of populist authoritarians like
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Orbán or Trump—and helps explain why prodemocratic European international
law fell short in the two pivotal moments discussed in this Essay.
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